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Abstract 
This paper presents information on wage bargaining institutions, collected using a standardised 
questionnaire. Our data provide information from 1995 and 2006, for four sectors of activity and 
the aggregate economy, considering 23 European countries, plus the US and Japan. Main findings 
include a high degree of regulation in wage setting in most countries. Although union membership 
is low in many countries, union coverage is high and almost all countries also have some form of 
national minimum wage. Most countries negotiate wages on several levels, the sectoral level still 
being the most dominant, with an increasingly important role for bargaining at the firm level. The 
average length of collective bargaining agreements is found to lie between one and three years. 
Most agreements are strongly driven by developments in prices and eleven countries have some 
form  of  indexation  mechanism  which  affects  wages.  Cluster  analysis  identifies  three  country 
groupings of wage-setting institutions. 
Keywords: wage bargaining, institutions, indexation, trade union membership, cluster analysis. 





Ce document présente les caractéristiques institutionnelles de la négociation des salaires en utilisant 
des informations recueillies au moyen d’un questionnaire standardisé. Ce questionnaire a permis de 
collecter des informations pour les années 1995 et 2006, pour quatre secteurs d’activité différents et 
pour l’économie dans son ensemble, dans 23 pays européens ainsi qu’aux États-Unis et au Japon. 
Nous concluons que le degré de réglementation de la fixation des salaires est assez élevé dans la 
plupart des pays. Bien que le taux de syndicalisation soit faible dans de nombreux pays, le taux de 
couverture  des  accords  est  élevé  et  presque  tous  les  pays  disposent  d’une  forme  de  salaire 
minimum national. Dans la plupart des pays, les salaires sont négociés à plusieurs niveaux, le 
secteur est souvent le niveau dominant de négociation même si les accords d’entreprise tendent à 
jouer un rôle de plus en plus important. La durée moyenne entre deux accords collectifs se situe 
entre un et trois ans. La signature de la plupart des accords est déterminée par l’évolution des prix 
et onze pays utilisent un mécanisme d’indexation pour fixer tout ou partie de leurs salaires. Une 
analyse par classification ascendante hiérarchique identifie trois groupes de pays partageant des 
caractéristiques communes dans leur mode de fixation des salaires.  
 
Mots-clés  :  négociation  salariale,  institutions  du  marché  du  travail,  indexation,  syndicats, 
classification ascendante hiérarchique.  
Codes JEL : J31, J38, J51, J58 
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Non-Technical Summary 
This paper provides an overview of the main institutional characteristics affecting wage formation 
in  developed  countries  over  the  last  decade.  The  information  presented  was  collected  using  a 
standardised questionnaire answered by national experts from the central banks of each of the 
countries considered. Our data provide information from 1995 and 2006 for 23 European countries, 
plus the US and Japan. An important value added of this dataset in relation to those underlying 
existing literature is the consistent coverage of institutional features for two common points in 
time. Furthermore, the questionnaire collects information at both the sectoral and national level and 
contains, to our knowledge, uniquely comparable information on wage bargaining institutions. This 
includes some more procedural aspects of union density, coverage and coordination, as well as 
other issues that can be related to the relative flexibility/rigidity of wages across countries, such as 
the average agreement length and elements considered during wage negotiations. Furthermore, this 
paper considers the role of government in the determination of not only public, but also private 
sector wages and the importance of minimum wages and wage indexation to wage setting.  
The main findings include: 
(i)  There  is  large  variation  in  the  degree  of  trade  union  density  across  countries  and  sectors. 
Although it has been declining over the past decade in Europe, a large proportion of workers are 
still covered by some kind of collective wage agreement and collective bargaining coverage is still 
generally high. Coverage generally increases with firm size and is more common for high-skilled 
employees, full-time employees and in the case of industry also manual workers. Furthermore, 
extension procedures (which make a collective bargaining agreement binding for all employees and 
employers within its usual field of application) are widespread in Europe.  
(ii) Considerable heterogeneity in the levels at which bargaining takes place is apparent across 
countries. In a first group of countries (Finland, Ireland and Slovenia) the national level of wage 
bargaining  is  dominant.  Negotiations  at  the  national  level  are  the  first  step  before  more 
decentralised (and less dominant) negotiations take place. In a second group of countries, which 
include nearly all euro area countries, Denmark, Japan and Norway, the sectoral level is the most 
dominant for wage bargaining. For most countries in this group, company-level agreements are 
common as the second (or third) stage of bargaining, There is some limited evidence that firms use 
“escape” clauses to avoid company level agreements from being at least as favourable as sectoral 
ones. In a third group, including Eastern European countries, France, Luxembourg, the UK and the 
US, the company level is dominant and wage bargaining systems are highly decentralised. 
(iii) Most countries are found to operate under some form of coordination. The exceptions are 
Hungary,  Poland  the  UK and  the  US.  Four  countries  have  some  form  of  state  imposed  wage 
indexation – namely Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovenia – and minimum wages with 
some  form  of  government  enforcement  are  used  as  a  coordination  device  in  six  countries.  In  
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Europe and the US, government is heavily involved in the setting of public sector wages and in 
eleven countries it is also involved in setting private sector wages. Inter-associational agreements 
have  gained  importance  over  the  last  decade  and  are  the  dominant  mechanism  for  wage 
coordination in three countries, intra-associational coordination is dominant in 8 countries. Finally, 
pattern bargaining, when negotiations start at one sectoral association (trend-setter) and are then 
repeated at others are found in Austria, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Some form of legally 
binding national minimum wage is found to exist in most countries in 2006, with the notable 
exception of Germany and Italy. Minimum wages generally cover less than 25% of the workforce. 
Increases in minimum wages can also form the basis for other wage increases. 
(iv) The average length of collective bargaining agreements lies between one and three years in 
Europe  and  is  one  year  in  Japan.  Most  agreements  follow  a  regular  calendar  and  many  are 
concluded  within  the  first  quarter  of  a  year.  With  regard  to  the  elements  entering  wage 
negotiations, prices are the most important determining factor. Eleven countries are found to have 
some form of indexation to prices (although significant differences exist between countries in terms 
of  the  reference  used)  and  when  indexation  is  fully  automatic  (as  in  Belgium,  Cyprus  and 
Luxembourg) it affects more than 66% of the workforce. Labour productivity is the second most 
important  factor  cited  as  entering  wage  negotiations  with  three  countries  making  reference  to 
national  productivity  developments  and  five  countries  considering  sectoral  productivity 
developments.  In  the  UK  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Japan),  firm  level  profitability  plays  an 
important  role.  Changes  in  taxation  and  social  contributions  are  cited  as  important  in  wage 
negotiations.  
As a conclusion, we summarize these main findings by using cluster analysis to group together 
countries that seem to have similar wage bargaining characteristics and to identify the broad types 
of bargaining systems that exist across the 25 countries. Three groups of countries can be identified 
through the cluster analysis of wage setting institutions: The first group (Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden) mainly consists 
of countries with a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining, which is quite typical of Western 
European countries. This group can be characterised by the existence of extension procedures and a 
high level of collective agreement coverage, a dominance of sectoral (and to a less extent firm-
level) wage bargaining and the general absence of coordination except through minimum wages (or 
trend setting sectors). The second group (Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and 
Spain) exhibits the same general wage setting characteristics of the previous group, except that in 
addition, indexation, intersectoral agreements and the role of government are all more important. 
Finally, the last group (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Poland, the UK and 
the US) gathers the countries where the wage bargaining system is largely deregulated.  
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Résumé non-technique 
Ce document présente les principales caractéristiques institutionnelles de la formation des salaires 
dans les pays développés au cours des dix dernières années. Les informations utilisées ont été 
recueillies au moyen d’un questionnaire standardisé auquel des experts nationaux issus des banques 
centrales ont répondu. Nos données fournissent des informations pour les années 1995 et 2006, 
pour 23 pays européens ainsi que pour les États-Unis et le Japon. Un avantage important de cette 
base de données par rapport à celles existantes dans la littérature est sa cohérence au cours du 
temps puisque cette base décrit la négociation salariale dans 25 pays pour deux années différentes. 
En outre, le questionnaire recueille de l’information pour différents secteurs et pour l’économie 
dans son ensemble et contient, à notre connaissance, des informations originales et comparables sur 
les  institutions  de  la  négociation  salariale.  Les  thèmes  couverts  par  le  questionnaire  sont  les 
suivants :  taux  de  syndicalisation,  taux  de  couverture  des  accords  collectifs  et  degré  de 
coordination/centralisation  des  négociations.  Il  contient  aussi  des  questions  liées  au  degré  de 
flexibilité/rigidité des salaires comme la durée moyenne entre deux accords et les déterminants de 
ces accords. En outre, ce document étudie le rôle des gouvernements dans la détermination des 
salaires des secteurs privé et public ainsi que l’importance du salaire minimum et de l’indexation 
dans la fixation des salaires. 
Les principales conclusions sont les suivantes:  
(i) Le  taux  de  syndicalisation  présente  des  différences  importantes  entre  les  pays  et  entre  les 
secteurs. Même si le taux de couverture des accords collectifs a diminué au cours de la dernière 
décennie en Europe, la plupart des salariés sont encore couverts par une accord collectif de 
salaire et le degré de couverture des accords reste élevé. Le taux de couverture des accords croît 
généralement avec la taille de l’entreprise, il est plus élevé pour les employés qualifiés, les 
employés  à  plein  temps.  Dans  l’industrie  et  en  particulier  pour  les  ouvriers,  le  taux  de 
couverture  est  plus  grand.  En  outre,  les  procédures  d’extension  des  accords  collectifs  (qui 
rendent une convention collective obligatoire pour tous les employés et les employeurs dans le 
champ d’application de l’accord) sont très répandues en Europe. 
(ii)  Les  niveaux  dominants  de  la  négociation  salariale  sont  assez  différents  entre  les  pays.  En 
Finlande, Irlande et Slovénie, le niveau national domine. Les négociations nationales précèdent 
le plus souvent des négociations plus décentralisées. Dans presque tous les pays de la zone euro 
mais  aussi au  Danemark,  au Japon  et en  Norvège,  c’est  le  niveau sectoriel  qui  est  le  plus 
important.  Pour  la  plupart  de  ces  pays  toutefois,  des  accords  d’entreprise  enrichissent  les 
accords sectoriels. Dans certains pays, il est possible pour les entreprises de déroger aux accords 
sectoriels pour proposer des accords moins favorables au niveau de l’entreprise, toutefois ces 
clauses dérogatoires semblent encore peu utilisées. Dans les pays d’Europe de l’Est, en France, 
au  Luxembourg,  au  Royaume-Uni  et  aux  États-Unis,  le  niveau  de  l’entreprise  domine  la 
négociation salariale.   
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(iii) Dans la plupart des pays, le processus de négociation salariale est plus ou moins coordonné. La 
Hongrie, la Pologne, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis font exception. En Belgique, à Chypre, 
au Luxembourg, et en Slovénie, la loi impose une indexation des salaires. Un salaire minimum 
national fixé par le gouvernement est aussi une forme de coordination dominante dans six pays. 
En Europe et aux États-Unis, le gouvernement fixe les salaires du secteur public et dans onze 
pays, il est également impliqué dans la fixation des salaires du secteur privé. Les accords inter-
sectoriels  ont  gagné  en  importance  au  cours  de  la  dernière  décennie  et  sont  le  principal 
mécanisme de coordination des salaires dans trois pays. La coordination intra-sectorielle domine 
dans huit pays. Enfin, en Autriche, Allemagne, Norvège et Suède, il existe un secteur dominant 
sur lequel les autres secteurs de l’économie se coordonnent. En 2006, dans la plupart des pays il 
existe un salaire minimum national excepté en Allemagne et en Italie. Le salaire minimum 
national couvre dans tous les pays moins de 25% de la main-d’œuvre. Les augmentations du 
salaire  minimum  national  peuvent  servir  de  base  à  d’autres  augmentations  de  salaire  dans 
certains pays.  
(iv) La durée moyenne entre deux accords collectifs se situe entre un et trois ans en Europe et est 
d’un an au Japon. La signature des accords suit généralement un calendrier régulier et beaucoup 
d’accords sont conclus au cours du premier trimestre de l’année. Parmi les déterminants de la 
négociation salariale, on trouve les prix qui apparaissent comme un facteur important. Dans 
onze pays, l’indexation des salaires sur les prix existe sous une forme ou sous une autre et quand 
l’indexation est entièrement automatique (comme en Belgique, à Chypre ou au Luxembourg), 
elle couvre plus de 66% de la main-d’œuvre. La productivité du travail est le deuxième facteur 
cité comme entrant dans les négociations salariales. Au Royaume-Uni (et dans une moindre 
mesure au Japon), le niveau de profitabilité de l’entreprise joue un rôle important. 
 
En conclusion, nous résumons les principaux résultats à l’aide d’une classification. Cette analyse 
permet  de  regrouper  les  pays  partageant  des  caractéristiques  institutionnelles  similaires  et 
d’identifier les grands types de négociation salariale. Trois groupes de pays sont obtenus à partir 
d’une  classification  hiérarchique  ascendante.  Le  premier  groupe  (Allemagne,  Autriche, 
Danemark, Espagne, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Pays-Bas, Norvège, Portugal et Suède) est 
principalement composé de pays avec un système de négociation salariale largement réglementé. 
Ce groupe peut être caractérisé par l’existence de procédures d’extension, un important taux de 
couverture des accords collectifs, une prédominance de la négociation sectorielle (et dans une 
moindre mesure au niveau de l’entreprise) et généralement un faible degré de coordination. Le 
second  groupe  (Belgique,  Chypre,  Finlande,  Luxembourg,  Slovénie  et  Espagne)  présente  les 
mêmes caractéristiques de fixation des salaires que le groupe précédent mais l’indexation, les 
accords intersectoriels et le rôle du gouvernement sont plus importants. Enfin, le dernier groupe 
(République Tchèque, Estonie, Hongrie, Japon, Lituanie, Pologne, Royaume-Uni et États-Unis) 
rassemble les pays où le système de négociation salariale est déréglementé, les négociations sont 
décentralisées et peu coordonnées.  
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1. Introduction 
Among the labour market structures influencing macroeconomic performance, wage bargaining 
institutions affecting wage outcomes play an important role. There is a vast literature on the role of 
collectivisation,  centralisation  and  coordination  of  wage  bargaining  in  shaping  labour  market 
outcomes, wage levels, wage dispersion and wage flexibility. In a recent survey, Freeman (2007) 
presents three ways in which wage-setting institutions affect economic performance: they “alter 
incentives”, they “facilitate efficient bargaining”, and they “increase information, communication, 
and trust”. Institutional arrangements related to the labour market may also modify the effect of 
monetary policy on inflation and unemployment. The well-known Barro and Gordon (1983) model 
emphasizes the inability of monetary policy to influence unemployment directly: first, unions set 
nominal wages conditionally on rational expectations of the money supply, then the central bank 
sets the money supply to minimize inflation and unemployment. The equilibrium of this model is 
characterized  by  monetary  policy  neutrality  and  excess  inflation.  On  the  other  hand,  recent 
literature shows that non-neutrality can appear when there are strategic interactions between unions 
and the central bank. Soskice and Iversen (2000) show that when there is a finite number of wage-
setters  and  product  markets  are  monopolistic,  a  non-accommodating  monetary  policy  leads  to 
important effects on employment. These conclusions are empirically supported by Cukierman and 
Lippi (1999), Hall and Franzese (1998) and Aidt and Tzannatos (2005). Using model simulations, 
Acocella et al. (2008) find that the effects of monetary policy on the real economy may depend on 
the different wage setting strategies.  
The relationship between wage bargaining institutions and wage rigidity is also interesting for 
monetary policy since nominal rigidities play a crucial role in explaining the impact of monetary 
policy on output. Nominal wages may be rigid downwards because of the presence of substantial 
resistance to nominal wage cuts, most often attributed to money illusion, fairness considerations, 
nominal minimum wages or nominal contracts (Keynes 1936, Slichter and Luedicke 1957, Tobin 
1972,  Akerlof,  Dickens  and  Perry,  1996).  Under  low  inflation,  such  rigidity  means  that  more 
workers  have  real  wage  freezes  and  fewer  experience  real  wage  cuts  than  would  be  the  case 
otherwise. This is of concern to monetary authorities because the lack of real wage cuts may cause 
unemployment, while the possibility of a higher inflation target would ease this problem as it 
would de facto allow for greater cuts in real terms. In particular, macroeconomic models have 
recently shown the importance of real wage rigidity in reproducing nominal rigidities (Christiano et 
al. (2005)). Alternatively, if the resistance to wage cuts is informed e.g. as a result of unionisation 
or wage indexation, wages may still exhibit downward real rigidity (see Dickens et al. 2007). If 
workers resist real (rather than nominal) wage cuts, a higher inflation target will not ease the 
problems associated with downward real wage rigidity. In this case wage changes will be highly 
concentrated at or above the expected rate of inflation, irrespective of the rate of inflation. In this 
paper, we provide some detailed and comparative insight into wage bargaining institutions such as 
the duration of agreements and its main determinants, including possible indexation mechanisms  
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that  naturally  affect  the speed and the extent  to  which  wages  react  to  economic  changes.  For 
example, the available literature suggests that the average duration of wage agreements limits the 
relative flexibility of wages (see Taylor (1983), Cecchetti (1987), Fregert and Jonung (1998) who 
use this duration as an indicator of rigidity). Furthermore, Dickens et al. (2007) find a positive 
relationship between the degree of union density and union coverage and real wage rigidity. 
Although the theoretical literature accords an important role to wage bargaining institutions and a 
vast empirical literature tries to quantify this role, the measurement of institutions remains difficult 
and  comparable  information  at  an  international  level  is  still  limited.  Arguably  the  most 
comprehensive time series of quantitative information on the percentage of union density, the ratio 
of minimum to median wage, and indexes of union coverage, coordination and corporatism for a 
number of OECD countries is available from the OECD (see for example Elmeskov, Martin and 
Scarpetta 1998). However these series provide little information on any other aspects of wage 
setting mechanisms and very little qualitative information on how wage setting institutions are 
designed or how they function. Furthermore, information for some EU countries is not available. 
This  makes  a  good  understanding,  and  particularly  the  cross-country  comparison,  of  such 
institutions difficult.  
More  detailed  quantitative  time  series  and  qualitative  information  on  other  aspects  of  wage 
bargaining mechanisms (such as union membership, union coverage, bargaining level, the extent of 
government involvement in wage setting and the largest unions) is available in Golden, Lange and 
Wallerstein (1998) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). Kenworthy (2001) provides comparative 
information on many indexes of corporatism and Checchi and Lucifora (2002) provide a bivariate 
dummy for the existence of wage indexation for some countries up until the late 1990s. However, 
these sources generally lack recent information since the mid-1990s or 2000, are not available for 
many  EU  countries  and  the  degree  of  qualitative  information  available  is  varied.  Finally, 
international organisations such as the European Commission, the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO) and the OECD (e.g. in their Employment Outlook 2004, 2005) provide more 
detailed  qualitative  information  from  ad-hoc  studies  of  particular  aspects  of  wage  setting 
institutions.  The  sometimes  non-standardised  nature  of  the  collection  or  presentation  of  this 
information,  the  varying  and  different  coverage  of  countries,  periods  and  institutional  features 
considered  can  make  the comparison of institutions  across countries difficult.  Finally,  detailed 
quantitative and qualitative information on variables such as average agreement length and detailed 
information on institutions such as wage indexation mechanisms (arguably extremely important to 
understand the link between wage and price developments) is generally not available. Nor do any 
of the above sources provide sectoral information on wage-setting institutions by country. 
This paper thus adds to the existing literature on wage bargaining institutions and attempts to fill in 
some of the gaps in the available quantitative and qualitative information by providing an overview  
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of the main characteristics affecting wage formation in 23 European countries
2
, the United States 
and Japan for the years 1995 and 20063. The information in this paper is based on a standardised 
questionnaire answered by national experts from central banks of each of the countries concerned. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 looks at the questionnaire design and 
gives  details  of  the  data  collection  method,  outlining  the  aspects  of  wage  setting  mechanisms 
considered. Section 3 looks at the collectivisation of wage bargaining in the 25 countries covered, 
including  the  degree  of  trade  union  density,  collective  bargaining  coverage  and  extension 
procedures. Section 4 outlines the degree of centralisation across countries. Section 5 describes the 
coordination of wage bargaining, also including the role of government in the setting of not only 
public,  but  also  private  sector  wages.  Section  6  examines  the  main  determinants  of  wage 
agreements,  their  average  duration  and  the  possible  existence,  design  and  coverage  of  wage 
indexation mechanisms. As a conclusion, we summarize our results by doing a cluster analysis and 
grouping countries with similar institutions of wage bargaining.  
2. Data 
The information  in this  paper  was  collected  using  a  standardised  questionnaire  (see  Annex  1) 
especially designed within the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network. This 
network was made up of national experts and leading academics in the area of wage setting and the 
questionnaires themselves were completed by national experts from the central banks of each of the 
countries considered, who were both committed and responsible for giving detailed and accurate 
replies.  Within  this  setting,  the  most  common  disadvantage  of  using  a  questionnaire  for  data 
collection (namely, low or non-response) is overcome. Furthermore, other typical caveats of a 
questionnaire based survey, such as subjective assessments which may vary across respondents in 
different countries, or the use of different definitions for the one or other indicator which are not 
fully comparable across countries are also arguable less problematic within this framework: First, 
the respondents are usually experts in the area of wage setting, therefore their knowledge of the 
subject  matter  should  be  maximised  and  subjectivity  minimised.  Second,  many  respondents, 
through their day to day work, participate regularly in the collection of data to be used for cross 
country  study  within  e.g.  the  Eurosystem.  They  are  therefore  arguably  more  aware  of  the 
importance of comparability of data across countries and of those definitions most appropriate and 
commonly used for cross-country comparison. Although the total absence of caveats related to the 
use of a questionnaire cannot be guaranteed, we find that answers are consistent with and add to 
previously available information on wage setting institutions. Annex 2 presents a comparison of 
some of the information we collected with OECD data. For some of the countries under study here, 
                                                       
2  These  are  Austria,  Belgium,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
3 
Respondents were requested to provide information on wage bargaining institutions for current practices or 
the most recent year available (in most cases 2006) and a reference point a decade earlier (in most cases 
1995).   
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OECD collected comparable information on trade union density (Annex 2 Table 4), union coverage 
(Annex 2 Table 5), extension procedures (Annex 2 Table 6), and the level of wage bargaining 
(Annex 2 Table 7). For these 4 variables, the answers to our questionnaire and OECD data provide 
very similar results, giving us confidence that the data we collected is generally accurate and highly 
comparable, across the dimensions of time and country.  
This questionnaire was designed to collect comparable information on key wage setting institutions 
for two data points (1995 and 2006) and 4 sectors (agriculture, industry, market services and non-
market services (based on the NACE)) as well as the total economy. 23 European countries, Japan 
and the US took part in this data collection exercise. An important value added of this data in 
relation to pre-existing information is that it allows a comparison of the most recent features of 
wage setting institutions with a common reference point in the previous decade. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire to our knowledge collects some uniquely comparable information on sectoral wage 
setting and wage bargaining institutions, starting from some  more procedural aspects of union 
density, coverage and coordination and continuing with further issues that can be related to relative 
flexibility/rigidity of wages across countries, such as average agreement length and the elements 
considered during wage negotiations. In addition, this paper also considers the role of government 
in  the  determination  of  not  only  public,  but  also  private  sector  wages  and  the  importance  of 
minimum  wages  and  wage  indexation  in  particular.  In  order  of  the  questionnaire,  data  was 
collected on: details of trade union density; collective bargaining; the level of wage bargaining; the 
coordination  of  wage  bargaining;  the  determinants  of  collective  wage  negotiations;  collective 
bargaining  agreement  length;  minimum  wages  and  indexation  mechanisms.  Respondents  were 
asked to state a reply, or alternatively indicate that data were not relevant, or alternatively not 
known. The data presented in this paper is based on the pure data collected. That is, it does not mix 
information from other sources. Comparison of some of the rudimentary information available 
from  other  sources  indeed  shows  a  high  degree  of  the  comparability  of  replies.  For  example, 
comparison  with  information  available  from  the  European  Trade  Union  Institute  (ETUI)  e.g 
Fajertag (2000) and European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) on the country-specific 
systems in the mid to late 1990s including average contract length and level of minimum wages is 
in line with that collected in this dataset.  
Although  much  effort  was  assigned  to  collecting  detailed  information  on  the  most  important 
characteristics of wage setting institutions in a comparable way, it should also be noted that the 
details of national wage setting institutions are inherently complicated. Individual countries may 
have exceptions, nuances and additional elements to any of their wage setting institutions, which 
underlay the key characterisation of their national system. One paper cannot hope to do justice to 
this complexity while also presenting all of national details in a short and accessible manner. Here, 
we therefore focus on the key characteristics of each national system.  
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3. Collectivisation of wage bargaining 
The first characteristic of wage setting that we consider is collectivisation. Many studies have 
related the collectivisation of wage setting to average wage levels and to the responsiveness of 
wages to labour market conditions. Collectivisation is generally measured by the proportion of 
workers in a workplace that are trade union members (trade union density) and by the proportion 
that  are  covered  by  a  collective  wage  agreement  (collective  bargaining  coverage).  The  above-
mentioned international data sources generally cover this aspect of wage setting for the national 
level rather well. We provide here information from questions 1 and 2 of the questionnaire, for our 
set of 25 countries, for 1995 and 2006. 
The degree of trade union density, defined as the percentage of workers who are members of a 
trade union, varied strongly across developed countries in 2006 (Question 1, see Figure 1 and 
Annex 3 Table 8). It is relatively high in countries like Denmark, Finland and Sweden (between 70 
and 80%). Trade union densities in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Norway are a little lower in 
a  close  range  between  50%  and  60%.  In  contrast, the  lowest  rates  of  trade  union  density  are 
observed in most of the Eastern European countries, France, Spain, and the United States (close to 
10%-15% or less). Trade union density decreased around the industrialised world between 1995 
and 2006. It decreased particularly strongly in Eastern Europe and the former Eastern Germany. In 
contrast, countries where the trade union density was already rather low did not experience any 
further strong decrease in trade union density during the last decade (see Annex 3 Table 8). 
Figure 1: Countries with very low to high trade union density  
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Note: 0%<VL=Very Low<25%, 26%<L=Low<50%, 51%<M=Moderate<75%, 76%<H=High<100% 
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The rate of trade union density also differs significantly across sectors. In most countries, union 
density is the highest in non-market services. In this sector, rates of membership below 25% are 
rare (see Figure 2 and Annex 3 Table 8) and rates have generally been stable over the last decade in 
most countries, even slightly increasing in the UK and US. Union density is lower but traditionally 
still important in the industrial sector. In the majority of countries, rates of trade union density in 
this sector range between 25 and 50%, but have been declining since 1995. Density rates are very 
low in market services and agriculture. In market services, the lowest rate is observed in France and 
in the United-States (around 5%) where density rates are half as high as those in industry and even 
three times lower than in non-market services. Union density rates in the market services sector 
have also declined over the last decade. 
Figure 2: Trade Union Density by Sectors (% of total countries with very low, low, medium 
and high levels of trade union density, total economy and by sector across time) 
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Although trade union density has been declining over the past decade in Europe, a large proportion 
of  workers  are  still  covered  by  some  kind  of  collective  wage  agreement.  In  fact  collective 
bargaining coverage is still generally high in Europe (Question 2, see Table 1 below). In Austria, 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Portugal and Slovenia the 
coverage rate is between 80 and 100% and stable (or even slightly increasing in some countries) 
over  the  last  decade.  On  the  other  hand,  bargaining  coverage  is  low  in  the  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, the UK (between 30 and 40%), and especially low in Japan, Lithuania and the 
United States (lower than 20%), even decreasing in the case of the latter since the mid-nineties. 
Coverage rates also vary across sectors, but for those countries where national collective bargaining 
coverage rates are high, coverage rates are also consistently high across sectors. In both Germany  
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and Spain, the decrease in coverage rates stems mainly from the industry sector. In countries with 
low or very low bargaining coverage, coverage is also very low in market services, higher but still 
low in the industry sector and a little higher in the non-market services. 
Table 1: Trade union coverage by country, across sectors and time  
2006/Most recent 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995
Austria H H H H H H H H H H ￿
Belgium H H H H H H H H H H
Cyprus M M ￿
Czech Republic L M L M M L ￿
Denmark M L ￿ H M ￿ M M ￿ H H H H ￿
Estonia L
Finland H H H H H H H H H H
France H H ￿ H H ￿ H H H H ￿
Germany (West) M H ￿ M H ￿ L L H H M M ￿
Germany (East) L L L L L L H H L M ￿
Greece H H H H H H H H ￿
Hungary VL VL ￿ L L ￿ L L ￿ L L ￿ L L ￿
Ireland
Italy H H H H H H H H H H
Japan VL L ￿ VL VL ￿ VL VL ￿ VL VL
Lithuania VL VL VL VL VL VL L L VL VL
Luxembourg VL H H H M
The Netherlands H H H H H
Norway L L M M M M H H M M
Poland L M ￿
Portugal H H H H H H H H H H
Slovenia H H H H H H H H H H
Spain H M ￿ H H ￿ H M ￿ IR IR H H ￿
Sweden H H H H H H H H H H
The Untited Kingdom VL L VL M L L ￿
The United States VL VL VL VL ￿ VL VL ￿ VL VL ￿ VL VL ￿
In sum - number of countries
Very low 4 4 3 2 4 3 2 2 3 3
Low 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 5 3
Moderate 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 0 4 6
High 9 9 12 12 10 10 13 14 12 12
Total 18 17 21 19 20 19 19 18 24 24
Note: 2006 refers to 2004 in Germany, 2005 in Spain, 2004 in France, 2000 in Denmark, 2003 in Estonia, 2004 in Hungary, 2001 in Poland
Note: 1995 refers to 1997 in France, 1994 in Denmark, 1998 in Hungary and 2000 in Luxembourg
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Non-Mkt Serv
Note: Arrows refer to position in 2006 relative to 1995, if quantitaive value is provided and difference is at least 1pp. A sign is also filled in if there is a change in 
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv
 
Note: 0%<VL=Very Low<25%, 26%<L=Low<50%, 51%<M=Moderate<75%, 76%<H=High<100% 
An important feature for Continental Europe countries is the difference between very low rates of 
trade union density and high rates of collective bargaining coverage. Two factors explain this 
discrepancy between union density and union coverage. First, contrary to the US, in most European 
countries, employers voluntarily apply to non-union members the terms of an agreement. Thus, 
workers can be covered by a wage agreement without being members of a trade union, which has 
generally  reduced  trade  union  membership.  The  second  explanation  is  the  existence  and  the 
widespread use of extension procedures for (sector-level) wage agreements (see Annex 3 Table 9). 
These  procedures  (which  are  generally  administrative  or  legal)  make  a  collective  agreement 
binding  for  all  employees  and  employers  within  its  usual  field  of  application,  even  if  some 
employers or trade unions did not directly sign the agreement. This means that in those countries 
where trade union bargaining generally occurs at a sectoral level, extension procedures may extend 
the coverage of the outcome of this bargaining to cover additional sectors, firms and therefore also 
individuals who are not members of the negotiating unions. By definition, these procedures directly 
or indirectly extend the effects of bargaining agreements by increasing the “collectivisation” of 
wage bargaining. In some countries, such an extension is automatic (see Annex 3 Table 10), such  
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as in Spain (by law), Italy (by the constitution)4 or Austria (due to mandatory membership of 
employers in the Austrian Economic Chambers). However, for the majority of countries, public 
institutions play a crucial role, with specific public commissions taking charge of extensions (e.g. 
in  France,  Finland,  Germany,  Hungary  or  Luxembourg).  Extensions  can  also  be  requested  by 
unions, employers or the Ministry of Labour, being granted by a public decision (such as a decree 
or a specific decision from the Ministry of Labour). Other requirements may also need to be met 
before an extension is possible. For example, in Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Spain, at least 50% of employees must already be covered by a wage negotiation for an extension 
to be possible. 
The absence of extension procedures is rare in Europe. Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Spain all have extension procedures. In the Czech Republic and in Germany, such procedures 
are  limited  to  specific  sectors  and  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia  and  Slovenia  extension 
procedures have been adopted only very recently. The lack of extension procedures in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden is explained by the already very high level of trade union membership. In 
Cyprus, Lithuania and the UK, extension procedures did not exist in 2006 and the rate of collective 
bargaining coverage is almost equal to that of trade union density, thus collective agreements only 
apply for union members. This is very similar to the American case. 
Coverage also appears to vary to some extent by firm size (at the firm level) and worker type (for 
example at the industry or sectoral level). Differences across firms of different size are apparent in 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the UK 
and the US. In principle, coverage increases with firm size. For example, in the case of Western 
Germany, coverage increases from 30%, to 60%, to 80% for respective firm sizes of 1-9, 50-199 
and over 500 employees respectively. Some countries like Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, and Slovenia mention the existence of higher coverage rates for some types of 
workers. These include better-educated/higher-skilled employees, full-time employees and in the 
case of industry, manual workers.  
4. Centralisation of wage bargaining 
The  economic  literature  predicts  different  impacts  of  the  centralization of  wage  bargaining  on 
economic performance. Bruno and Sachs (1985) support the view that there is a linear relationship 
between the centralization of wage bargaining and economic outcomes and the best economic 
outcomes are obtained when wages are set at a centralized level. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) in a 
well-known  paper  challenge  this  theory  and  suggest  a  hump-shaped  relationship  between  the 
degree of centralization of wage bargaining and economic performance with both centralized and 
                                                       
4 
Only “representative” agreements are extended - i.e. in case of disputation, judges can grant pay raises to 
workers  based  on  these  agreements  (though  no  law  defines  what  makes  a  collective  contract 
“representative”).  
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decentralized levels of wage bargaining helping to reduce unemployment and inflation. They argue 
that in centralised environments “large and all-encompassing trade unions naturally recognise their 
market power and take into account both inflationary and unemployment effects of wage increases. 
Conversely, unions operating at the individual firm or plant level have limited market power. In 
intermediate cases, unions can exert some market power but are led to ignore the macroeconomic 
implications of their actions” (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, p.13). A vast empirical literature (see 
Aidt and Tzannatos (2005) or Flanagan (1999) for surveys) concludes that it is difficult to find a 
robust relationship between the centralization of wage bargaining and economic outcomes.  
A  second  interesting  issue  is  the  relationship  between  wage  dispersion  and  the  level  of  wage 
bargaining. Wages that are not sufficiently differentiated, for example, by skill or region may 
contribute to increase the mismatch between labour supply and labour demand, thus increasing the 
unemployment rates of some skill groups and in some regions. If relative wage compression is too 
strong, in particular low-skilled workers or workers living in low productivity regions may remain 
unemployed. Similarly minimum wages which are too high may price young and lower skilled 
workers out of the labour market. Highly centralized wage bargaining can be expected to lead to 
less wage dispersion than under decentralized wage bargaining and empirical results obtained with 
micro data seem to confirm these expectations (see Card and de la Rica (2006), Cardoso and 
Portugal (2005), Hartog et al. (2002)).  
Question 3 collects information on the level of wage bargaining.  In  most countries wages are 
negotiated  at  multiple  levels.  Two  related  questions  therefore  emerge:  at  which  level  does 
bargaining take place and what is the relationship between the different levels of wage bargaining 
in the whole process through which final outcomes are reached? Our data distinguishes between 6 
levels of bargaining: national, regional, intersectoral, sectoral, occupational and company level.  
Three  levels  of  bargaining  appear  to  be  less  important  than  the  rest  -  the  regional  level,  the 
intersectoral level, and to a lesser extent the occupational level (see Figure 3). The regional level is 
only relevant for wage bargaining in Austria, France, Germany and Spain. Intersectoral agreements 
are  observed  only  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Norway  and  Sweden.  Agreements  at  the 
occupational  level  are  observed  in  a  slightly  larger  group  of  countries.  Consequently,  wage 
bargaining is the most common in Europe, the US and Japan at three levels, namely the national, 
sectoral and company level. According to the answers to our wage questionnaire, in Europe, the 
sectoral level is the most frequently occurring and also tends to be dominant. The company level is 
also very usual but generally not dominant.5  
Cross country heterogeneity in the levels at which wage bargaining takes place is strong and three 
groups of countries can be identified: First, in Finland, Ireland and Slovenia, the national level of 
wage bargaining is dominant. In these countries, negotiations between trade unions and employer 
                                                       
5 The dominant level does not necessarily need to be only one. For more details on this topic see part 4.  
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federations at the national level lead to general recommendations for negotiations at lower levels. 
These negotiations are the first step before more decentralized and less dominant negotiations take 
place at the sectoral level in Finland and Slovenia or at the firm level in Ireland.  
Second, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden the sectoral level is the dominant one for wage 
bargaining,  which  does  not  exclude  that  national  guidelines  could  still  play  a  role  in  these 
countries.  In  Germany  and  Spain,  sectoral  level  bargaining  is  coupled  with  regional  level 
negotiations. For most of the other countries in this group, company-level agreements are common, 
but cover a limited share of employees (10% in Spain and 22% in France), with the exception of 
Denmark where company agreements are dominant in the industry sector. Generally speaking, 
company level agreements cannot be less favourable than sectoral agreements. Even if firms can 
legally avoid sectoral level clauses (as in Austria, France since 2005, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Spain) these “escape clauses” were scarcely used in 2006. On 
the other hand, escape clauses have been commonly used in Germany in the most recent years, 
allowing for more flexibility at the company level as individual firms have been able to control and 
cut down on wage costs by limiting for example bonus and holiday payments. 
Third, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the UK and US, 
the company level is the dominant level of wage bargaining and wage bargaining systems are 
highly  decentralized.  Sectoral  or  national  levels  of  wage  agreements  existed  in  some  Eastern 
European countries in the mid 1990s, but by 2006 no longer played a role. 
Significant heterogeneity in the wage bargaining level across sectors is not apparent. One can only 
note that non-market services wages are often set at the national level through negotiation with the 
government. For example, even when company-level agreements dominate in the market sector in 
countries like Lithuania and the UK, government or at least public health employees’ wages are 
determined at a national level. With the exception of the changes in Eastern Europe mentioned 
above, no variation in the dominant level of wage bargaining over time is apparent. Although it is 
generally  stated  that  bargaining  has  become  more  decentralised  in  many  countries  with  more 
negotiation taking place at the company level, this is mainly through additional adjustments at the 
company level or via the use of opt-out clauses in higher level agreements. All in all, the sectoral 
level  seems  to  have  maintained  the  dominant  role  in  most  countries.  Furthermore,  for  those 
countries with dominant sectoral bargaining, trade-union coverage is also generally higher.  
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Figure 3: The levels at which wage bargaining both occurs and is most dominant, by country over 
time 
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5. Wage bargaining coordination and government involvement  
The  coordination  of  wage  formation  relates  to  the  extent  to  which  wage  negotiations  are 
coordinated  across  the  various  wage  bargaining  levels/actors  within  an  economy  and  thus  the 
extent to which the external consequences of wage agreements on the whole economy are taken 
into account. Horizontal coordination requires the synchronisation of players within the same level 
of bargaining (e.g. in the case of sectoral wage bargaining, the synchronisation of different unions 
within the same sector) and vertical coordination refers to the synchronisation across the different 
levels  of  bargaining  explained  in  the  previous  section,  so  as  to  achieve  consensus  on  a  joint 
macroeconomic  strategy.  The  coordination  and  centralization  of  wage  bargaining  are  different 
concepts and the relation between the two is not obvious. For example, coordination is still possible 
in  an  environment  of  decentralised  wage  bargaining  if  coordination  institutions  are  present. 
Alternatively, coordination can be difficult to achieve at a centralized level if there are divisions 
among unions.  
It is not clear whether coordination is beneficial. Theoretical literature on the coordination of wage 
bargaining argues that a wage bargaining system with coordinated sectoral wage bargaining can 
lead to the same economic outcome as with centralized bargaining (Soskice, 1990, Teulings and 
Hartog, 1998). Moreover, strategic interactions between trade unions and monetary policy have 
been  extensively  studied  by  the  theoretical  literature.  The  general  conclusions  are  mixed,  but  
  18
suggest that semi-coordinated bargaining can lead to higher levels of employment, challenging the 
Calmfors and Driffill hump-shaped relationship.  
Our  data  distinguish  between  five  possible  forms  of  coordination,  these  are:  state-imposed 
indexation, state-imposed minimum wage and other government involvement, inter-associational 
coordination, intra-associational coordination, and pattern bargaining. Most countries operate under 
at least one form of coordination, with intra-associational coordination seeming to be dominant for 
the majority in countries, in line with most negotiations taking place at the sectoral level. However, 
in Hungary, Poland, the UK and the US, wage bargaining is characterized by highly decentralized 
wage  negotiations  and  no  coordination  (even  the  minimum  wage  plays  a  limited  role  in  the 
coordination  of  wages).  In  Ireland,  when  again  no  specific  type  of  coordination  is  apparent, 
national collective agreements are reached through a process of first negotiations between unions 
and  employers  and  then  further  negotiations  at  an inter-associational level.  Furthermore,  these 
characteristics of wage setting have remained very stable, with little apparent variation across time 
and almost none by sector. Results are gathered in Figure 4 and a more detailed description of the 
various forms of coordination in the Europe, Japan and the US follows.  
Figure  4:  Types  of  wage  bargaining  coordination  that  apply  and  are  most  dominant,  by 
country over time 
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5.1 Direct government involvement in wage setting 
a. State imposed wage indexation 
Answers to question 4 show that in three countries (Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg), state-
imposed indexation is a dominant form of coordination in the economy as a whole (see Figure 4).  
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These countries have a formal and automatic indexation of nominal wages to an official price index 
which goes beyond indexation clauses for some workers that need to be negotiated in each wage 
contract (this type of wage indexation is discussed further in section 6). In Luxembourg, wages are 
adjusted upwards, as soon as the 6-month moving average of the national CPI is 2.5% higher than 
its level when the last wage indexation occurred. In Belgium, there are several systems, with fixed 
time intervals or fixed magnitudes of 2 %, but  the reference index is always the “Health Index” 
(national CPI excluding motor fuels, alcohol and tobacco). In Cyprus, indexation is less formal, it 
is not legally binding but is part of the consensus between the government and social partners. 
Almost all collective agreements in Cyprus contain Cost-of-Living-Allowance (COLA) clauses 
(linked directly to the CPI change) and the government publishes twice a year the COLA index 
used in the wage bargaining process leading to a de facto automatic wage indexation. In some cases 
this has resulted into the need for additional measures to moderate wage inflation. Furthermore, in 
the  case  of  Belgium,  wage  indexation  is  nowadays  combined  with  national  intersectoral 
coordination. 
Looking into the sectoral information on this question, two more countries appear to have state-
imposed wage indexation, albeit only in the public sector, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In the 
case of Slovenia, state imposed indexation existed for the whole of the economy in 1995, but this 
was no longer the case for the private sector by 2006. Finally, the Polish public sector was also 
affected  by  state-imposed  wage  indexation  in  1995,  but  this  was  abolished  by  2006.  More 
information on less formal types of wage indexation and the way that price developments are taken 
into account in wage negotiation rounds can be found in the following section. 
b. State-imposed minimum wages  
Minimum wages are set through national legislation, collective agreements, or sometimes through a 
mixture of the two and are in all cases legally binding. Questions 4 and 8 of the questionnaire (see 
Table 2 below) show that some form of a national minimum wage was found in all countries under 
review in 2006, with the exception of only Italy, which had no state or other form of minimum 
wage in any sector of the economy6, and Germany, where bargained minimum wages were only 
present in a few branches of the industrial sector. In Nordic countries like Finland, Sweden and 
Norway but also in Austria, minimum wages are negotiated in each sector and are part of the 
collective agreements. Seventeen countries had a state imposed minimum wage in 2006. National 
minimum wages were introduced in Ireland and the UK during the ten year period considered.  
State-imposed minimum wages are minimum wages which are enforced by government. Whereas 
under a system of negotiated minimum wages, workers not covered by a minimum wage agreement 
can be paid at rates below that minimum wage, this is not the case for workers under a national 
                                                       
6 In Italy, there is no national minimum wage. However, judges grant pay raises to workers based on sectoral 
extended agreements which may substitute for the legal minimum wage. 
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minimum wage, where a statutory or national minimum wage constitutes the legal wage floor for 
all  workers.  Question  4  shows  that  in  the  Czech  Republic,  France,  Lithuania,  Portugal  and 
Slovenia, a state imposed national minimum wage is the dominant form of wage coordination and 
is set by tripartite negotiations (including employer representatives, employee representatives and 
government, such as in Belgium) or decided unilaterally by the Government (as in France and 
Slovenia). Furthermore, the rate of increase in the minimum wage is often used as a reference for 
sectoral or even firm level wage bargaining in France, Greece, Ireland and Spain.  
Table 2: The existence of minimum wages, by country, sector and over time 
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Belgium Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cyprus Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Czech Republic Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Denmark N N Y* Y N N Y* Y
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
France Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Germany N N Y N N N N N N N
Greece Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Hungary Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ireland Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Italy N N N N N N N N N N
Japan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lithuania Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
The Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
The Untited Kingdom Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
The United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
In sum - number of countries
Yes 17 15 18 16 17 15 17 15 17 16
Yes* 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 5
No 3 5 1 4 2 4 3 5 2 4
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv
  
Notes: Y: Exists, N: Does not exist, a * denotes the existence of minimum wages set by collective 
agreements as opposed to national legislation/statutory minimum wages. 
For  most  countries  where  a  statutory  minimum  wage  exists,  the  actual  proportion  of  workers 
working at that wage is systematically less than 25% (see Annex 3 Table 11). Three groups of 
countries can be distinguished. In Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the 
US, less than 5% of employees were paid at the minimum wage in 2006. In Estonia, Hungary, 
Portugal or Lithuania, the figure was between 5 and 10% and in Cyprus, France, and Luxembourg 
between 10 and 20%. This coverage varies with sector, the proportion of employees paid at the 
minimum wage being higher in market services and lower in non-market services than in other 
sectors. There is also evidence that the proportion of employees paid at the minimum wage has 
increased in some countries such as Cyprus, France and Hungary over the last decade. 
The level of minimum wages (statutory or bargained) varies significantly by country at above 
1,000 euros per month in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and in 
the UK in 2006, and less than 500 euros in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, 
and Lithuania. The position of the minimum wage on the wage distribution also differs across  
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countries. In Spain, the minimum wage is equal to less than 30% of the average wage of all 
employees in 2006. In contrast, it is above 50% in Finland, France and the Netherlands. For those 
countries with a comparatively low level of minimum relative to the average wage, the tendency 
has been for this ratio to increase over the last decade (see Figure 5). 
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In some countries such as Austria, Germany, Japan, Spain and Sweden the level of minimum 
wages is also sector specific. There are variations between the minimum  wages of blue-collar 
workers and white-collar workers in Denmark, between manual and non-manual workers in Austria 
and Greece and by occupation in Spain and Sweden. A number of countries set a lower level of 
minimum  wages  for  the  young,  less  educated  while  the  minimum  wage  also varies  by  tenure 
(Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Sweden and the US). Variation by hours of work (Slovenia) and region (Japan) are also apparent. 
However, most countries do not consider their minimum wages to interact with other systems of 
protecting pay at the lower end of the labour market (such as training schemes and wage subsidies), 
with the exception of Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Portugal. In these countries, 
unemployment benefits, social benefits, vocational subsidies and wage subsidies can depend upon 
the level of minimum wages.  
In terms of how fast they rise, minimum wages are indexed or adjusted for past inflation or some 
other inflation measure in most countries, including Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia 
(inflation forecast), France (indexed), Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the 
US (most commonly with reference to the CPI and with indexation in some US states). In some 
countries fairness arguments related to convergence to average pay (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy, Lithuania) or at least increases similar to the economy average (Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary,  Japan,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain  and  Sweden)  or  European  Union  average 
(Greece) are also taken into account. Minimum wages are adjusted according to explicit formulas  
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in France, Poland and to a lesser extent Estonia. However, in all countries apart from Germany 
(where the minimum wage is binding for a limited number of sectors), minimum wage increases 
are also legally binding at the national level and in Austria, France, Greece, Ireland and Poland, 
they also constitute a floor or a determining factor for other wage increases. 
c. Other government involvement 
In Europe and in the US, the government is heavily involved in the setting of public sector wages. 
Answers to question 5 of our questionnaire show this to be the case for most countries with the 
exception of Japan and Sweden, with specific commissions sometimes in charge of the bargaining 
process and after negotiations with the unions (see Figure 6). The final decision is however largely 
in  the  hands  of  the  government  and  ultimately  dependent  and  consistent  with  the  annual 
government budget that needs to be approved by the Parliament. In the cases of federal systems, 
like Germany and the US, the government is involved in the setting of wages at the federal level 
and for federal employees, but further negotiations take place at the level of the Länder or the 
individual States for local public employees.  
In some countries, the government also provides specific mediation services for the private sector 
as an intermediary mostly in cases of disputes, such as in France (“Commission mixte paritaire” at 
the sectoral level - 88 cases in 2005), the US (National Mediation Board), Cyprus, Finland, Poland, 
the UK (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service - 1353 cases in 2002/2003 at the firm 
level). In Belgium, government can set the wage norm that gives the expected wage increase in 
three neighbouring countries as an indication of maximum wage increases in the own country and 
in  order  to  preserve  competitiveness,  in  case  social  partners  fail  to  agree  on  this  themselves. 
Turning  to  government  involvement  in  tripartite  agreements,  these  are  usually  geared  at  more 
social policy related issues like unemployment compensation, social security contributions and 
minimum wages (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania and Portugal). For example, the government intervenes in 
wage negotiations on a regular basis in Finland when a tripartite Incomes Policy Commission 
gathers  each  year  to  decide  wage  increase  guidelines,  in  principle  in  line  with  inflation  and 
productivity developments. In most countries, tripartite meetings are also held to discuss labour 
conditions, or promote social dialogue, with parties gathering on a regular basis (e.g. in Estonia and 
Hungary) or more irregularly (Cyprus in 2004, France in 2005 and Italy in 1993). Government 
involvement has remained very stable over last decade (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6: Form and extent of government involvement in wage setting, by country over time. 
(the government acts as an intermediary, in tripartite agreements and in public wage setting) 
1995              2006 
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5.2 Inter and intra-associational coordination and pattern bargaining 
Based  on  the  replies  to  question  4  of  our  questionnaire,  it  appears  that  inter-associational 
agreements have gained importance over the last decade and that they are often the dominant 
mechanism of wage coordination, as in Belgium, Greece and Spain. In Belgium, negotiations take 
place every two years, when a wage norm is also agreed. In Spain, there has been a national 
agreement between major unions and employer representatives since 2002 that establishes the main 
lines of wage negotiation each year. In Finland, Ireland and Slovenia, general guidelines are set by 
a tripartite conference between the government, unions and employers federations. In Norway, 
negotiations take place at a confederal level in odd years and in other years, intersectoral elements 
are taken into account during negotiations. 
Intra-associational  coordination  or  coordination  within  peak  associations  occurs  when  unions 
and/or  employers’  organisations  take  the  lead  in  coordination  and  commit  to  undertake  joint 
decisions. This is naturally the case when peak associations encompass most bargaining units. Intra 
associational coordination is dominant in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.  
Pattern bargaining occurs when wage negotiations start in one (often sector-level) bargaining unit 
(the  leader)  and  are  then  repeated  by  other  bargainers  (followers)  who  orientate  their  wage 
negotiations towards the leading sector’s settlements (Question 4). Sometimes the agreements in 
the leading sector have such a strong influence that wage formation becomes de facto coordinated. 
In  Austria,  Germany,  Norway  and  Sweden,  the  industrial  sector  is  often  the  first  to  conclude  
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agreements and is then followed by other sectors. The exchange of information within and between 
sectors is easier when this takes place within a smaller country like Austria for example. In the 
latter case, economic forecasts by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, which is de facto 
owned by the social partners, also play a major role as they are regarded by all negotiators as 
authoritative.  
6. Length and other elements/determinants entering collective wage agreements 
As outlined in the introduction, a particularly relevant question from the view of the monetary 
policy-maker is how collective bargaining agreements affect the rigidity/flexibility of wages. For 
example,  the  average  duration  of  wage  agreements  and  the  main  determinants  of  collective 
agreements can be expected to limit the relative flexibility of wages.  
Question 7 of the questionnaire collects information on the average length of collective bargaining 
agreements. Figure 7 shows that, according to most recent data, the average length of collective 
agreements varies between one and three years in Europe and stands at one year in Japan (see also 
Annex 3 Table 12). European countries with the longest average agreement length of three years 
are Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. In contrast, average agreement lengths of one and one and a half 
year’s duration are found in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Poland and the United Kingdom. In Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg Norway, Slovenia and Spain, agreements frequently last two years or two years and a 
half. In Europe as a whole, very little change in the average agreement length is apparent over the 
last decade. However in Denmark, Finland and Germany, the replies to the questionnaire suggest 
that the average agreement length has increased, possibly implying less flexibility, but also the 
possibility of longer higher-level agreements that allow however more flexibility at lower (e.g. 
company) levels. In terms of differences across different economic sectors, some countries quote 
longer agreements in services, such as Estonia, Hungary and Spain. In some cases public sector 
wage agreements have a shorter duration compared to the market sectors, of about a year, possibly 
reflecting the link of public sector wage-setting to annual budgets.  
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Figure 7: Average Collective Agreement Length by country, over time (in years) 


























In most countries, a “seasonality” of wage negotiations is observed. In Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK, wage negotiations begin at 
the end of one year or the first months of the next and agreements are concluded, mostly within the 
first quarter. This regular pattern is slightly modified in France where a peak is also observed in 
July (due to minimum wage adjustments), in Japan where nation-wide wage negotiations (called 
Shunto) take place in April, in Norway where the peak is observed between March and June and in 
Slovenia where wage negotiations mostly take place in August. For the other countries (the Czech 
Republic,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  US)  no 
particular month of the year when wage negotiations take place is defined, but many negotiations 
start one to two months prior to the end of a particular agreement. Some variation in the timing is 
apparent by sector, notably in Luxembourg, Norway (where industry usually negotiates first) and 
Portugal and public sector pay is specified in April while public sector pay is specified in April in 
the UK and is usually set within the first two months of the year in Greece  
Delays in renegotiations are more common than pre-expiry renegotiation and in several countries 
(see  Annex  3  Tables  13 and  14).  Pre-expiry  negotiations  are  frequent  in the  Czech  Republic, 
Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and the US and can be related 
at  times  to  cyclical  downturns  and  concerns  about  competitiveness  (Luxembourg)  or  financial 
problems at the company level (Netherlands). Delays are observed frequently in Austria, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and in the US. These delays 
are usually due to the inability of parties involved in negotiations to reach an agreement and are 
commonly followed by retroactive application and one-off payments, e.g. in France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. Differences in terms of renegotiations and delays across sectors and  
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different  types  of  workers  (e.g.  manual/non-manual,  skilled/unskilled,  part-time/full-time, 
permanent/temporary workers) are generally not apparent. Delays have become more common over 
the last decade in Germany. 
Turning now to the elements entering collective wage negotiations, respondents were asked in 
question 6 to consider some broad categories of factors and provide details on the way that these 
are  taken  into  account.  These  broad  categories  were  namely:  prices,  labour  productivity, 
competitiveness and changes in taxation or social contributions.  
As one might expect, prices were found to be the most important determinant of negotiations. In 
almost all countries, the reference price index is the CPI, in some cases with its forecast entering 
negotiated wage increases (Slovenia and Sweden). More specifically on the role of prices in the 
determination  of  wage  increases,  further  information  was  requested  in  question  9,  where 
respondents were asked to address the issue of wage indexation, i.e. the case where price dynamics 
are indexed either automatically or through wage guidelines and incorporated into wage increases, 
rather than just being part of the elements discussed during wage negotiations. The extent to which 
wages are adjusted to price increases - in a formal or informal way - has an important impact on 
labour  market  and  macroeconomic  outcomes  and  is  typically  a  crucial  parameter  in  many 
macroeconomic models. Institutional data sources are almost always limited to binary information, 
i.e. whether or not a country has formal indexation by law or not. However, indexation can also be 
less formal, e.g. when there is no regulation covering the whole economy but still the incorporation 
of price increases in some segments of the labour market is widely accepted. In addition, it is also 
possible that some types of wages are automatically indexed according to law - often minimum 
wages - while others are not. The information received via the questionnaire on which this paper is 
based is innovative on this issue, through trying to assess the overall degree to which workers are 
actually affected by some kind of formal or informal wage indexation. 
We find that 11 countries have some form of wage indexation to prices (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain and the US) (see Table 3 
below). Some differences exist between countries in terms of the reference that is used, with most 
countries  linking  wage  increases  to  past  price  increases  usually  using  some  sort  of  a  moving 
average (Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Spain and the US). In some cases however, wage 
increases actually embed expected inflation (Estonia, Slovenia) or a combination of an adjustment 
for  past  unforeseen  increases  and  expected  inflation  ahead  (Finland,  Italy  and  Ireland). 
Furthermore, in some countries, wage indexation is fully automatic, with wages being adjusted as 
soon as inflation exceeds a reference rate (Cyprus, Luxembourg and partly Belgium), while in 




Table 3: Percentage of workers covered by wage indexation clauses, by country and sectors, 
across time  
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Belgium H H H H H H H H H H
Cyprus M M
Czech Republic None None None None None None None None None None
Denmark None None None None None None None None None None
Estonia None None None None None None None None None None
Finland H VL H VL H VL H VL H VL
France VL VL VL VL VL VL
Germany None None None None None None None None None None
Greece None M None M None M None L None M
Hungary None None None None None None None None None None
Ireland None None None None None None None None None None
Italy VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Japan None None None None None None None None None None
Lithuania
Luxembourg H H H H H H H H H H
The Netherlands None None None None None None None None None None
Norway None None None None None None None None None None
Poland VL VL VL VL VL
Portugal None None None None None None None None None None
Slovenia VL H VL H VL H H H L H
Spain None None H M
Sweden None None None None None None None None None None
The Untited Kingdom None
The United States VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
In sum - number of countries
Very low 5 4 6 5 6 5 4 4 5 5
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
High 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3
Total 8 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 11 11
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
VL = Very Low <0-25%>; L = Low <26-50%>; M = Moderate <51-75%>; H = High <76-100%>
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agriculture Industry Market Services Non Market Services
 
We  distinguish  between  countries  with  no  formal  indexation,  countries  with  full  automatic 
indexation,  countries  where  only  the  minimum  wage  is  indexed,  and  finally  countries  where 
indexation  is  implemented  through  collective  wage  agreements.  When  indexation  is  fully 
automatic, like in Belgium7, Cyprus (where the system is mixed see above) and Luxembourg , it 
affects nearly 100% of the workforce, but less when it works through collective agreements (like in 
Finland and Spain), as the resulting coverage also depends on the general collective agreement 
coverage. When the indexation is obtained through minimum wages, this coverage is as expected 
much lower (e.g. France and Slovenia). Finally, for some countries like Austria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland and the US, there does not appear to be any particular form of wage indexation to 
prices, nonetheless a low proportion of wage earners is affected, namely via some but limited 
amount of wage contracts.  
No significant differences appear across sectors in terms of the extent to which wages are affected 
by indexation and no big changes have been introduced in the last decade. However, in Italy the 
reference value used is now the consensus expected inflation rather than the government target, in 
Greece past catch-up clauses for higher than realised inflation have been abolished and in Slovenia 
wages are now linked to expected rather than past inflation.  
                                                       
7 Note however that the reference price is the so called "Health Index", which excludes prices of motor fuels, alcohol and 
tobacco from the NICP, thus mitigating the second-round effects of oil price shocks on wages. Moreover, the indicative 
wage norm is set in nominal terms and an increasing number of collective agreements feature an all-in clause that avoids 
indexation to unexpectedly high inflation.  
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Labour productivity (at the firm, sector or economy-wide level) is the second most cited factor 
entering wage negotiations (Question 6). The link between wage growth and labour productivity is 
of course a natural one, however it is interesting to see whether different measures of productivity 
are taken into  account  across  countries and sectors.  It  turns  out  that  countries  can  broadly  be 
divided into two groups in terms of measures of productivity considered, namely countries that 
consider productivity in the economy as a whole (Cyprus, France, Germany) and countries where 
sectoral  developments  are  taken  into  account  (Belgium,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  in  some 
industrial sectors and Estonia in industry and the market services). In Japan and Norway, it is 
productivity both at the firm and the sectoral level that affect wage negotiations. In most cases, the 
level at which productivity developments are taken into account is consistent with the respective 
level on which collective agreements are signed. However, in the public sector, labour productivity 
appears to play less of a role and if any, only at the economy-wide level. Finally, no changes 
appear  to  have  taken  place  in  the  last  decade  in  terms  of  the  way  or  the  degree  to  which 
productivity developments are taken into account in wage negotiations.  
Turning to further elements in the determination of collective wage agreements, it appears that 
competitiveness  issues  also  play  a  role in  most countries  (Question 6).  In  the  case  of  smaller 
countries such as Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway, 
the average pay increases of the neighbourhood countries (competitors and trading partner) are 
taken  into  consideration.  Similarly  in  the  UK,  firm  profitability  plays  a  vital  role  in  wage 
negotiations.  
A  further  important  element  in  wage  negotiations  is  possible  changes  in  taxation  and  social 
contributions. Apparently, such changes are used rather commonly as arguments for wage changes, 
while in some cases like Slovenia significant tax changes may even result in renegotiations of 
contracts. Finally, fairness issues and the convergence of wages in a sector also play a role in 
determining wage agreements in France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg and Lithuania.  
7. Concluding cluster analysis  
As a conclusion, we summarize our main findings by grouping together countries that seem to have 
similar wage bargaining characteristics. We then draw a general picture of the resulting broad types 
of  bargaining  systems  that  exist  across  countries,  while  also  explaining  the  main  remaining 
differences among countries within these types.   
For this purpose, we run a hierarchical cluster analysis using most of the information obtained 
using  the  questionnaire.  We  focus  on  data  for  the  year  2006  (omitting  information  on  East 
Germany)  for  the  following  variables:  trade  union  density,  extension  procedures,  coverage  of 
collective agreements, existing and most dominant and levels of wage bargaining, existence of 
opening clauses, type of coordination, government involvement in wage setting, average agreement 
length, existence of a minimum wage and type of indexation and proportion of workers covered by  
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wage indexation arrangements. The variables used in this analysis are more precisely described in 
Annex 4 and are either actual answers to the questionnaire or recoded values for the relevant 
variables based on these answers. All variables are ordinal (in line with most of the answers to the 
questionnaire) and thus using the same type of variables makes the distance computation more 
consistent.  The  analysis  has  been  undertaken  using  SAS  procedures.  We  use  the  method  of 
Euclidian distance and run the algorithm of the most distant neighbour to clearly separate the 
different groups. The results of this analysis are illustrated in the dendrogram in Figure 8 below.  
 
Three groups of countries can be identified through the cluster analysis of wage setting institutions: 
1.  The  first  group  mainly  consists  of  countries  with  a  broadly  regulated  system  of  wage 
bargaining, which is quite typical of Western European countries. This group can be characterised 
by the existence of extension procedures and a high level of collective agreement coverage, a 
dominance of sectoral (and to a lesser extent firm-level) wage bargaining and the general absence 
of coordination except through minimum wages (or trend setting sectors). This group can then be 
further divided into four subgroups: 
a.  The first subgroup consists of Austria, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
These countries present the core group of countries with a dominance of sector-level 
wage bargaining, the existence of statutory minimum wages and extension procedures. 
b.  In the second subgroup, we find Germany and Italy; they differ from other countries in 
this  group  because  there  are  no  statutory  minimum  wages  and  coordination 
mechanisms are weak. This subgroup is pretty close to the first one. 
c.  In Ireland, contrary to the other countries of this group, national-level bargaining is 
important, trade union density is higher and wage agreements are of a longer duration.   
d.  In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, both trade union density and average agreement 
length are high, coordination mechanisms are more important and governments have a 
limited role. 
2.  In the second group, the wage bargaining system can be seen as even more regulated because 
indexation  and  government  interventions  play  a  more  important  role.  This  second  group 
exhibits the same general wage setting characteristics of the previous group, except that in addition, 
indexation, intersectoral agreements and the role of government are all more important. In addition, 
trade union densities are generally higher. This group is found to include: 
e.  Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg where wage indexation covers most workers. 
f.  Spain, Slovenia and Finland where wage indexation operates through minimum wage 
or collective agreements. 
3.  Finally,  the  last  group  gathers  the  countries  where  the  wage  bargaining  system  is  largely 
deregulated. The US can be considered as a role model here. This group includes countries with 
very low trade union densities, low levels of collective agreement coverage, the general absence of  
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coordination, decentralised wage bargaining frameworks and a relatively short agreement length of 
about one year. This group is found to include: 
a.  The  Czech  Republic,  the  UK  and  the  US:  These  countries  form  a  core  group, 
characterised by decentralised and uncoordinated wage bargaining. 
b.  Estonia,  Hungary,  Lithuania  and  Poland:  These  countries  have  experienced  large 
changes  in  their  labour  market  institutions  over  the  recent  decade  with  generally 
decentralized  and  uncoordinated  systems,  but  still  some  government  involvement 
(mainly through tripartite agreements). 
c.  In  Japan,  the  system  is  less  decentralised  compared  to  the  other  countries  of  this 
group.  The  industry-level  wage  bargaining  plays  a  greater  role  and  the  wage 
bargaining process is more coordinated.  
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More generally, the wage setting institutions considered in the 25 countries considered show little 
sectoral and time variation in wage setting institutions over the last decade, although there is some 
tendency of a greater “feeling” of decentralisation through opt-out clauses and additional firm-level 
agreements. Very little change in the average agreement length is apparent over time. These results 
suggest that wage bargaining institutions have been rather stable over the last decade and that the 
institutional features covered and measured by our questionnaire have been relatively untouched by 
labour market reforms.  
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Initial General Remarks: 
 
·  This questionnaire is addressed to NCBs8. It aims to collect all information on wage setting 
available to each NCB in a harmonised fashion. 
·  In terms of the time period to be covered, the target is to have information for 2006 or the most 
recently available year and a point of reference in or around 1995.  
·  Respondents are kindly requested to supply figures or ranges in the quantitative questions, 
underline  relevant  answers  where  indicated  and  provide  further  explanatory/qualitative 
information in the qualitative questions. 





1.  Trade union density 
Please provide trade union membership in your country as a percentage of employees either in numbers or, if 
not available, by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-
75%> High <76-100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
 
  Agriculture 










Total  (NACE 
A-P) 
2006/Most recent 
information (please give 
date) 
         
1995/reference point 
(please give date) 
         
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
Do/did extension procedures 
exist in your country? (link to 
question 2) 
  1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
If yes, are/were they 
automatic? 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
Or do/did they alternatively 
need to be requested by one 
or by all parties? 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
2006  If yes, please provide details. 
1995 
                                                       
8 The replies to the questionnaire of the representatives of the 24 national central banks do not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the central banks they are affiliated to.   
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2.  Collective bargaining/ trade union coverage 
Please  provide  percentages  of  employees  covered  by  collective  agreements  either  in  numbers  or,  if  not 
available, by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%> 
High <76-100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
  Agriculture 










Total  (NACE 
A-P) 
2006/Most recent 
information (please give 
date) 
         
1995/reference point 
(please give date) 
         
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
Does/did coverage differ for 
different sizes of firms?  
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
2006  If yes, please provide details. 
1995 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
2006  
Yes / No 
Does/did coverage vary 
across different types of 





Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
1995 
Yes / No 
2006  If yes, please provide details. 
1995 
   
 
3.  Level of wage bargaining 
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place in your country.  
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
 
2006/Most recent 
information (please give 
date) 













National level           
Regional level           
Intersectoral level           
Sectoral level           
Occupational level           
Company level           
Which one (or more) of the 
above levels is (are) the most 
dominant?  
         
Please briefly explain the 
process through which the 
final bargaining outcome is 
reached.  
 
Please indicate major parties 




Is there a legal possibility for 
firms to deviate from higher 
level agreements, via for 
example so-called opening 
clauses?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, how wide is the use of 
this practice? 





(please give date) 
Agriculture 












National level           
Regional level           
Intersectoral level           
Sectoral level           
Occupational level           
Company level           
Which one (or more) of the 
above levels was (were) the 
most dominant?  
         
Please briefly explain the 
process through which the 
final bargaining outcome was 
reached.   
 
Please indicate major parties 




Was there a legal possibility 
for firms to deviate from 
higher level agreements, via 
for example so-called opening 
clauses?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, how wide was the use 
of this practice? 
         
 
4. Coordination of wage bargaining 
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the level(s) at which wage bargaining coordination takes place in 
your country. Please respond for each column in turn. 
 
2006/Most recent 
information (please give 
date) 
Agriculture 












State imposed 1 
pay indexation (also see 
question 5) 
         
State imposed 2 
statutory minimum wage (also 
see question 6) 
         
Inter-associational  
by national or cross-sectoral 
agreements 
         
Intra-associational 
within peak employers’ and 
trade union organisations 
         
Pattern bargaining  
coordination by a sectoral 
trend-setter 
         
Other (please specify)           
Which one (or more) of the 
above levels is (are) the most 
dominant? 
         
 
1995/reference  point 
















State imposed 1 
pay  indexation  (also  see 
question 5) 
         
State imposed 2 
statutory minimum wage (also 
see question 6) 
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Inter-associational  
by  national  or  cross-sectoral 
agreements 
         
Intra-associational 
within  peak  employers’  and 
trade union organisations 
         
Pattern bargaining  
coordination  by  a  sectoral 
trend-setter 
         
Other (please specify)           
Which  one  (or  more)  of  the 
above  levels  was  (were)  the 
most dominant? 
         
 
5. Nature of government involvement /legislation at a national level  
Please provide comparative information on government involvement in the wage setting process.  
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
 
  2006/Most  recent  information 
(please give date) 
1995/reference  point  (please  give 
date) 
Is/was the government 
involved as an intermediary 
between trade union and 
employers?  
Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please provide details 
on this process. 
   
Is/was the government 
involved in tripartite 
agreements?  
Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please provide details 
on this process. 
   
Is/was the government 
involved in the setting of 
public sector wages? 
Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please provide details 
on this process. 




6. Determinants of/factors entering collective wage negotiations: 
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the factor(s) which enter collective wage negotiations in your 
country. Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.. 
 
2006/Most recent 















Prices: please specify price 
index used 
         
Labour productivity 
please specify if using 
average labour productivity of 
whole economy, sector, 
industry, firm 
         
Competitiveness: please 
specify indicator used e.g. 
average pay increase in 
neighbouring countries, other 
(please specify) 
         
Other: please specify            
Do changes in taxation or 
social contribution rates affect 
wage negotiations? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, how?   
Please provide if available the 
relevant formula used, on the 
basis of the above noted 
factors. 
























Prices: please specify price 
index used 
         
Labour productivity: 
please specify if using 
average labour productivity of 
whole economy, sector, 
industry, firm 
         
Competitiveness: please 
specify indicator used 
e.g. average pay increase in 
neighbouring countries, other 
(please specify) 
         
Other: please specify           
Did changes in taxation or 
social contribution rates affect 
wage negotiations? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, how?   
Please provide if available the 
relevant formula used, on the 
basis of the above noted 
factors. 




7. Collective bargaining agreement length  
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
 
2006/Most recent 
information (please give 
date) 
Agriculture 












Average length of new 
agreements 
         
Is there a specific timetable 
for wage negotiations in your 
country? e.g. a specific 
month(s) within a year 
(please specify) 
         
Are re-negotiations before 
normal agreement expiry 
common? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Are delays in agreement 
renewal common?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
What determines these 
irregularities? e.g. cyclical 
downturns, other (please 
specify) 
 
What kinds of measures are 
adopted to deal with them? 
e.g. one-off payments, other 
(please specify) 
 
With respect to the answers 
given above, are there any 
differences between different 




Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please provide details.   
 
1995/reference point 




















Average length of new 
agreements 
         
Was there a specific timetable 
for wage negotiations in your 
country? e.g. a specific 
month(s) within a year 
(please specify) 
         
Were re-negotiations before 
normal agreement expiry 
common? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Were delays in agreement 
renewal common?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
What determined these 
irregularities? e.g. cyclical 
downturns, other (please 
specify) 
 
What kinds of measures were 
adopted to deal with them? 
e.g. one-off payments, other 
(please specify) 
 
With respect to the answers 
given above, were there any 
differences between different 
types of workers? e. g. 
manual/non manual, 




If yes, please provide details.   
 
8. Statutory/national minimum wages  
For the questions requiring percentages please provide figures as percentages in numbers or, if not available, 
by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%> High <76-
100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated. 
 
2006/Most recent 















Do minimum wages exist in 
your country? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Where do these stem from? 
































Percentage of employees 
paid at the minimum wage 
         
Level of minimum wage in 
euros 
         
Ratio of minimum to average 
wage 
         
Ratio of minimum to median 
wage 
         
Elements affecting the level 
of minimum wages: 
e.g. sector, region, 
manual/non-manual 
workers/trainees, years of 
experience, age, education, 
marital status, disabilities, 
other (please list all that 
apply)   
         
Does the minimum wage 
interact with other systems 
of protecting pay at the 
bottom of the labour market? 
(e.g. training schemes, wage 
subsidies)  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please explain.   
Elements affecting the rate 
of increase in minimum 
wages: 





factors, other (please list all 
that apply)  
         
Give formula for the 
increase, if relevant, using 
the elements considered, as 
listed above. 
 
Are increases in minimum 
wages binding? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Are increases in minimum 
wages taken as a basis for 
other wage increases?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  
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If yes, how?   
 
1995/reference point 




















Did minimum wages exist in 
your country? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Where did these stem from? 
































Percentage of employees 
paid at the minimum wage 
         
Level of minimum wage in 
euros 
         
Ratio of minimum to average 
wage 
         
Ratio of minimum to median 
wage 
         
Elements affecting the level 
of minimum wages: 
e.g. sector, region, 
manual/non-manual 
workers/trainees, years of 
experience, age, education, 
marital status, disabilities, 
other (please list all that 
apply)   
         
Did the minimum wage 
interact with other systems 
of protecting pay at the 
bottom of the labour market? 
(e.g. training schemes, wage 
subsidies)  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, please explain.   
Elements affecting the rate 
of increase in minimum 
wages: 





factors, other (please list all 
that apply)  
         
Give formula for the 
increase, if relevant, using 
the elements considered, as 
listed above. 
 
Were increases in minimum 
wages binding? 
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
Were increases in minimum 
wages taken as a basis for 
other wage increases?  
Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No  Yes / No 
If yes, how?   
 
9. Indexation mechanisms (also see/use information/updated information  in Annex 1 to this 
questionnaire)  
For the questions requiring percentages please provide figures as percentages in numbers or, if not available, 
by choosing from the following ranges: 
Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%> High <76-100%> 




information (please give 
date) 
Agriculture 












Percentage of workers 
covered by automatic/direct 
indexation mechanisms 
         
The information below is intended to largely correspond to the information in Annex 1, but in addition 
allow for a sectoral view and a comparison to 1995  
Type of indexation 
none/automatic/only in 
minimum wages/part of 
negotiations/combination 
(please provide details) 
         
Which price index is used for 
reference? 
         
Does indexation refer to its 
past, expected or targeted 
annual rate of increase? 
         
Average duration of 
agreements 
         
If relevant, under what 
circumstances does 
renegotiation take place?  
         
If there is a retroactive 
element to wage indexation in 
your country, please provide 
details of the relevant process.  
 
 
1995/reference point (please 
give date) 
Agriculture 












Percentage of workers 
covered by automatic/direct 
indexation mechanisms 
         
The information below is intended to largely correspond to the information in Annex 1, but in addition 
allow for a sectoral view and a comparison to 1995 
Type of indexation 
none/automatic/only in 
minimum wages/part of 
negotiations/combination 
(please provide details) 
         
Which index was used?           
Did indexation refer to its past, 
expected or targeted annual 
rate of increase? 
         
Average duration of 
agreements 
         
If relevant, under what 
circumstances did 
renegotiation take place?  
         
If there was a retroactive 
element to wage indexation in 
your country, please provide 




PLEASE CHECK THAT NO BOXES HAVE BEEN LEFT BLANK 





Annex 2: Comparison of questionnaire replies with other data sources 
 
Table 4: Trade union density 





Reference year 1990 1994 1995 2000 2006
Austria 46 42 46 36.5 35
Belgium 51 54 52 55.6 57
Czech Republic - - L 27.0 L
Denmark 71 76 89 74.4 82
Finland 72 81 78 76.2 69
France 10 9 8.2 9.7 VL
Germany 33 29 28.7 25.0 21.7
Greece 34 - L - VL
Hungary - - 19.7 19.9 16.9
Ireland 50 - 27.6 - 45.8
Italy 39 39 L 34.9 L
Japan 25 24 22.7 21.5 18.1
Luxemburg 50 - 51 33.6 48.1
Netherlands 26 26 28.4 23.2 26.8
Norway 56 58 M 54.0 M
Poland - - 33 14.7 15
Portugal 32 32 L 24.3 L
Spain 11 19 VL 14.9 VL
Sweden 83 91 H 81.1 H
United Kingdom 39 34 29 31.2 25.8
United States 16 16 14.9 12.8 12.5  
Sources: OECD 94-97: OECD Employment Outlook 1994, p. 184 and 1997, p. 71; OECD 2004: 
OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3. 
 
Table 5: Union coverage 
Source OECD 1997 W&H (2000) OECD 1997
WDN
Questionnaire W&H 2000 OECD 2004
WDN
Questionnaire
Reference Year 1990 1990 1994 1995 1996 2000* 2006
Austria 98 71 98 95+ - 95 98
Belgium 90 90 90 more than 90 - 90 more than 90
Czech Republic - L - 25 M
Denmark 69 - 69 79 55 80 83
Finland 95 95 95 >90 95 90 >90
France 92 95 95 93.3 90 90 97.8
Germany 90 76 92 59 83 68 72
Greece - H 90 - H
Hungary - 45.1 45 30 38.5
Italy 83 82 H 90 80 H
Japan 23 - 21 20.2 - 15 16.1
Netherlands 71 60 81 81 80 80 81
Norway 75 75 74 M 66 70 M
Poland - M - 40 L
Portugal 79 62 71 H - 80 H
Spain 76 60 78 82.5 82 80 78.5
Sweden 86 83 89 H 85 90 H
United Kingdom 47 65 47 34.5 48 30 33.5
United States 18 - 18 16.7 - 14 13.6  
* Lower bound estimates 
Sources: OECD 1997: OECD Employment Outlook 1997; W&H (2000): Waddigton and Hoffman 
(2000); OECD 2004: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3. 
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Table 6: Extension procedures 
Source
Extension Automatic Extension Automatic
Austria N (Y) Y N
Belgium Y N Y N
Denmark N N
Finland Y N Y N
France Y N Y N
Germany Y N Y (specific) N
Greece Y N Y N
Hungary Y N Y N
Ireland Y (rare) Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y
Netherlands Y N Y N
Norway N N
Poland Y N Y Y
Portugal Y N Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y
Sweden N N
United Kingdom N N
United States N N
OECD (2004) WDN questionnaire (2006)
 
Sources: OECD (2004): OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3, Table 3.4 p. 148. 
 






1990-94 1995 1995-2000 2006
Austria I I +Occ I I +Occ
Belgium I I I I
Czech Republic Co Co Co Co
Denmark I Co/I Co/I Co/I
Finland Ce I Ce Ce
France Co/I Co/I Co/I Co/I
Germany I I + Reg I I + Reg
Hungary Co Co Co Co
Ireland I/Ce Ce I/Ce Ce
Italy Co/I I Co/I I
Japan Co I Co I
Netherlands I I I I
Norway I/Ce I I/Ce I
Poland Co Co Co Co
Portugal I/Ce I I/Ce I
Spain I I + Reg I I + Reg
Sweden I I+Occ I I+Occ
United Kingdom Co Co Co Co
United States Co Co Co Co  
Legend:  Co : company level ; Co/I : combination of company and industry levels ; I: industry level ; 
I/Ce : industry level and regular central-level agreements ; Ce: central-level agreements. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex 4: Variables included in the hierarchical analysis 
1.  Trade union density (question 1) (VL, L, M, H (coded 1-4));  
2.  Extension procedures (question 1) (none, requested, automatic (coded 1-3)) 
3.  Coverage of collective agreements (question 2) (VL, L, M, H (coded 1-4)) 
4.   Most dominant level of wage bargaining (question 3) (national, regional, sectoral, company (coded 
1-4)) 
5.  Level of wage bargaining – company, occupational, sectoral, intersectoral, regional, national (all 
question 3) (all coded 0-1) 
6.  Existence of opening clauses (question 3) (coded 0-1) 
7.  Coordination  -  pay  indexation,  inter-associational,  intra-associational,  statutory  minimum  wage, 
pattern bargaining (all question 4) (all coded 0-1) 
8.  Government  involvement  (question  5)  (none,  public  sector  wages,  intermediary,  tripartite 
agreements (coded 0-3)) 
9.  Average length of wage agreements (question 7) (coded 1-3) 
10. Minimum wage (question 8) (none, collective agreements, statutory (coded 1-3)) 
11. % of workers covered by indexation mechanisms (question 9) (0, VL, L, M, H (coded 0-4)) 
12. Type of indexation (question 9) (none, minimum wage, collective agreements, automatic (coded 1-
4)). 
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